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TO BE OR NOT TO BE: FCC REGULATION OF
VIDEO SUBSCRIPTION TECHNOLOGIES*
Allen S. Hammond, IV**
Recent innovations in microwave and satellite technology are creating a
new video marketplace.' Liberalized Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) market entry policies have stimulated an increase in the number and
type of video program distribution facilities available to serve the public.
These services compete with television for the delivery of information and
entertainment to the private home and include cable television, direct broad-
cast satellites (DBS),2  multichannel, multipoint distribution service
(MMDS) and its predecessor multipoint distribution service (MDS),3 in-
structional television fixed service (ITFS),4 operational fixed service (OFS),5
and subscription television (STV).
Presumably, this new video marketplace will be characterized by increas-
ing competition between the new and established distribution services and
driven by consumer preference for a variety of information services.6 As a
consequence, the entry of the new services has been hailed as an opportunity
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1. See generally 1986 Field Guide to the Electronic Media, CHANNELS, Nov.-Dec. 1985
[hereinafter cited as Channels Field Guide]; Stern, Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video
Marketplace and The Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529
(1983); MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITIONS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT].
2. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text; see also Author's Note last page.
4. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
6. See Stern, Krasnow & Senkowski, supra note 1, at 531; see also Hammond, Now You
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to enhance the American public's first amendment rights to know and to
speak.7 Paradoxically it has also been viewed as a new and perturbing op-
portunity for fractionalism by fragmenting audiences through market seg-
mentation and consumer preference, as well as for eviscerating democracy
through increased concentration of media ownership.'
Currently, the FCC is considering the ultimate manner in which the new
services will affect the public's first amendment rights.9 Although each of
the microwave- and satellite-based distribution services share common char-
acteristics of transmission and information capacity with traditional broad-
cast service, and compete against conventional broadcast service for
significant portions of the general audience, the Commission has refrained
from regulating these services as broadcasting under title III of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.10 Instead, the Commission has argued that the new
subscription services are nonbroadcast and has declined to apply the polit-
ical access and fairness provisions of title III to the services.
Because the Communications Act does not specify how these new services
are to be characterized, the Commission has applied different regulatory
schemes to each. Thus, it has regulated MDS licensees as common carriers
under title II of the Communications Act of 1934.1" On the other hand, it
has found DBS and OFS to be hybrid services having characteristics of
See It, Now You Don't: Minority Ownership in an "Unregulated" Video Marketplace, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 633, 635 (1983).
7. The information revolution offers great promise of enhancing. . . [the right to speak,
the right to know, and the right to privacy] and their underlying democratic values. Bazelon,
The First Amendment's Second Chance, CHANNELS, Feb.-Mar. 1982, at 16-17.
8. Barber, The Second American Revolution, CHANNELS, Feb.-Mar. 1982, at 21-25, 62;
see also Bazelon, supra note 7, at 16-17.
9. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In re Subscription Video Serv., FCC Gen. Docket
No. 85-305, released Jan. 8, 1986 [hereinafter cited as Subscription Video Serv.].
10. Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), requires broad-
cast licensees to maintain editorial control over the content of their transmissions. See Na-
tional Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
11. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1982), requires all com-
mon carriers to serve all members of the same class of consumers indifferently. The licensee
must allow its customers to have control over the content of the information transmitted. See
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
MDS operators have been deemed common carriers. As such, they must provide transmis-
sion capacity to the public under tariff on a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis and
are prohibited from exercising editorial control over the content of the transmissions. Micro-
band Corp. of America, 70 F.C.C.2d 231 (1979). By contrast, broadcasters may not allow the
public indiscriminate access to their transmission capacity and are held accountable for the
content of their programming. The Commission has relied on the statutory distinction be-
tween common carriers and broadcasters to justify its refusal to apply title III regulation to
MDS. See Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616, 618-19 (1974).
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broadcasting and common carrier, or broadcasting and point-to-point trans-
mission.' 2 The Commission, in its administrative discretion, has exempted
these services from traditional broadcast regulation. Finally, ITFS licensees
have been seen as a special class of videocasters deemed to fall outside ex-
isting regulatory classifications. They have been exempted from broadcast
regulation because ITFS is intended primarily to operate as an educational
service and only secondarily as a carrier or videocaster of subscription
programming. 13
Recent actions of the Congress and the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit have called into question much of the policy
the Commission has used to keep from extending title III regulation to the
subscription services. In 1982, Congress amended section 309(i) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934.14 The amendment statutorily recognized the simi-
larities between hybrid subscription services and broadcasting by classifying
these services as "media of mass communication." 15 In addition, the legisla-
tive history of Congress' recent amendment to the signal piracy statute, sec-
12. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708-09 (1982); Operational Fixed Serv.,
99 F.C.C.2d 715, 727 n.29 (1983).
13. In re Instructional Television Fixed Serv., MM Docket. No. 83-523, released June 20,
1985, at 20-21, 29, 37.
14. Section 309(i) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1982), autho-
rizes the Commission to conduct lotteries to award licenses for media of mass communication
where the number of applicants is too great to use the comparative licensing procedure.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(C) (1982). Congress has directed the Commission to apply sig-
nificant preferences in lotteries conducted by the Commission to award licenses for services
that
may be neither clearly common carrier nor broadcast entities (such as multipoint
distribution service), or services in which the applicant may be able to self-select
either common carrier or broadcast status (such as . . . direct broadcast satellite
service) . . . to the extent that the licensees have the ability to provide under their
direct editorial control a substantial proportion of the programming or other infor-
mation services over the licensed facilities.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2261, 2285, in which Congress required the FCC to establish ownership and diver-
sity preferences where licenses for mass media services are awarded via random selection. Id.
at 37-41, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2281-85. It might be argued that congres-
sional designation of MDS and other hybrid communications services as media of mass com-
munications for the purposes of the establishment of ownership and diversity preferences in a
lottery scheme has no relevance to whether or not the new services are broadcasting as defined
in § 153(o) of the Act. However, inherent in Congress' designation of a service as a medium of
mass communication is the recognition that the licensees of the service have the ability to
exercise editorial control over programming that is transmitted and of interest to the general
public and that may entertain, inform, and persuade regardless of its subscription nature.
Hence, Congress saw a need to assure greater diversity of ownership and diversification of
program content. See id. at 40, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2284. Perhaps even
more compelling is Congress' placement of the lottery provision with its application to sub-
scription services in title III.
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tion 605 (now 705) of the Communications Act of 1934, indicates that
section 605 provides protection against unauthorized reception of STV,
MDS, and DBS signals.' 6 When viewed in concert, the recent amendments
suggest that Congress deems hybrid services to constitute broadcast-like sub-
scription services whose signals are protected from unauthorized reception.
Finally, but perhaps more importantly, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Association of Broad-
casters v. FCC 7 held that at least one subscription service, DBS, constitutes
broadcasting as defined in section 153(o) of the Communications Act of
1934. 18 On January 8, 1986, in response to the NAB decision, the FCC initi-
ated a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to harmonize the regula-
tion of microwave- and satellite-based subscription services.9
The Commission's decision and the responses of Congress and the courts
will have a profound impact upon the manner and the extent to which elec-
tronic speech is to be regulated in the future. A decision to eschew the prin-
ciples of diversity and licensee responsibility to the public embodied in title
III and to rely instead upon competition in the marketplace would result in
the beginning of a fundamental rebalancing of the public's "right to know"
and the videocaster's "right to speak." This article explores the Commis-
16. In the legislative history accompanying the amendment of § 605, Congress stated:
H.R. 4103 as reported by Committee recodifies without modification section 605 to
the Communications Act of 1934 as new section 705(a). In amending existing sec-
tion 605, it is intended to leave undisturbed the case law that has developed confirm-
ing the broad reach of section 605 as a deterrent against piracy of protected
communications. Over the years federal courts, consistent with congressional intent,
have recognized that section 605 provided broad protection against the unauthorized
interception of various forms of radio communications. It is the Committee's inten-
tion that the amendment preserve these broad protections; that all acts which pres-
ently constitute a violation of present section 605 shall continue to be unlawful under
that section as amended and redesignated by H.R. 4103.
Section 605 not only prohibits unauthorized interception of traditional radio com-
munications, but also communications transmitted by means of new technologies.
For example, existing section 605 provided protection against the unauthorized re-
ception of subscription television (STV), multipoint distribution services (MDS), and
satellite communications. This amendment made by section 5 of the bill is intended
to preserve this broad reach of existing section 605 and to make clear that all com-
munications covered under section 605 will continue to be protected under new sec-
tion 705(a).
130 CONG. REC. S14,287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4746.
17. 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 1201. Section 153(o) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(o)
(1982) defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be
received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."
19. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 3-4, 17-21.
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sion's rationales for its proposed action in light of the current law and offers
observations on the advisability of the Commission's proposal.
I. THE FCC's CLASSIFICATION OF THE NEW
VIDEO DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
In the name of spectrum efficiency and economic pragmatism, the FCC
has created myriad opportunities for the distribution of video programming
to the home. These services are identical in all practical functional aspects
to broadcast service and are only slightly different in terms of ownership
restrictions and constraints upon the licensee's exercise of editorial control.
Each service relies on a technology that produces omnidirectional, point-to-
multipoint transmission patterns.2 ° Each service can carry the same amount
and types of information over its six-megahertz-wide channels.2 1 Moreover,
as they have presently evolved, each of the services is expected by the Com-
mission to be used in large measure, if not chiefly, for the distribution of
,ideo programming of interest to the general public.
Although the services are functionally similar to broadcasting, the Com-
mission has argued that the existence of their other nonbroadcast character-
istics precludes a determination that the services constitute broadcasting and
are subject to title III. In the process, the Commission has rendered the
regulatory distinctions between the services and broadcasting suspect if not
illusory.
A. Direct Broadcast Satellites
Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems are composed of high-powered,
multichanneled satellites transmitting programming over wide geographic
areas to single and multidwelling homes and cable systems. Earth stations
transmit signals to a satellite that receives, amplifies, and retransmits the
signals to receivers.2 2 The Commission authorized DBS services in 1982.23
20. See Instructional Television Fixed Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d 50 (1985); Instructional Televi-
sion Fixed Serv., 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, 1205-16 (1983); Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d 715,
716 (1983); Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982); Use of Private Microwave
Frequencies, 86 F.C.C.2d 299, 306, 311 (1981); Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d
616, 617 (1974).
21. See Instructional Television Fixed Serv., 101 F.C.C.2d 50 (1985); Instructional Televi-
sion Fixed Serv., 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, 1205-16 (1983); Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d 715,
716 (1983); Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982); Use of Private Microwave
Frequencies, 86 F.C.C.2d 299, 306, 311 (1981); Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d
616, 617 (1974).
22. Channels Field Guide, supra note 1, at 52; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCAST-
ERS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES AFFECTING RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING 17 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as NEW TECHNOLOGIES].
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The new service was expected to provide as many as thirty to sixty addi-
tional channels of video programming.2 4 Each channel possesses an
omnidirectional point-to-multipoint transmission pattern and possesses the
same capacity and ability to carry programming that broadcast services pos-
sess. As of 1984, eight companies have been authorized to construct systems
and provide service.2 5 The proposed system configurations range from two
to four satellites each using from two to as many as ten channels or tran-
sponders. Of the original eight permittees, only three appear to be making
actual progress toward constructing a system.2 6 At least one DBS service is
presently in operation and a second service is planned for 1988.27
DBS operators may elect merely to provide transmission capacity to
programmer-customers who in turn transmit programming to the public or
to cable operators. Alternatively, DBS operators may broadcast video pro-
gramming directly to the public or to cable operators over their satellite
transmission facilities. Because of these two different functions, when the
Commission authorized DBS service in 1982, it declined to require DBS sys-
tems to operate under a particular service classification, preferring to allow
"the developmental and experimental period [of DBS] . . . to run its
course." 28 The choice of service classification was left to the DBS system
operator. If the DBS operator merely provided transmission capacity, it
would be deemed a common carrier serving the public indiscriminately
under tariff, and thus subject to regulation under title II of the Communica-
tions Act.29 On the other hand, if the DBS operator broadcasted directly, it
would be deemed a broadcaster with editorial control over the content of its
programming, and thus subject to regulation under title III." ° In those in-
stances in which a DBS operator provided both services, it would be consid-
ered a hybrid service, subject to both title II and title III.3
23. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982).
24. Pitsch, Home Video Competition: What Should Regulators Do?, TVC, Oct. 1, 1982, at
78, 80.
25. The New Order Passeth, BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 43, 46, 50, 54.
26. Id.; see also Cable Programmers Use Satellites To Expand Consumer TV Market, Avl-
ATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 20, 1986, at 111; After 10 Years of Satellites, The Sky's No
Limit, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1984, at 42, 60-61.
27. The New Order Passeth, supra note 25, at 50.
28. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 708.
29. Id. at 709.
30. Id.
31. Report and Order In re Direct Broadcast Satellites, FCC Gen. Docket No. 80-603,
released July 14, 1982; Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking Regarding DBS,
46 Fed. Reg. 30,124 (1981); Notice of Inquiry Regarding DBS, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,719 (1980).
For a detailed discussion of the jurisdictional and regulatory considerations, see Ferris, Direct
Broadcast Satellites: A Piece of the Video Puzzle, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 169 (1981); Botein,
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The Commission also considered whether to apply title III regulatory con-
straints on programmer-customers of common carrier DBS operators. 32 It
concluded that nothing in the Communications Act or its legislative history
required that title III be applied to programmer-customers. The Commis-
sion also noted that imposing upon a common carrier's customers the lim-
ited access requirements now imposed upon broadcasters-the fairness
doctrine, equal opportunities for political candidates, and reasonable access
for federal candidates 33-merely would duplicate the more pervasive access
obligation already imposed upon the carrier itself. 4 The fact that the Com-
mission did not license or regulate the programmer-customers of common
carrier MDS operators was cited as support for the Commission's decision
not to regulate common carrier DBS programmer-customers.35
B. Multipoint Distribution Service and Multichannel Multipoint
Distribution Service
Multipoint distribution service (MDS) uses omnidirectional, microwave
signals in the super-high frequency broadcast band to deliver video, data,
text, and other information to single and multidwelling units and businesses.
MDS operators have traditionally leased a significant portion of their pro-
gram time to subscription services that receive their programming from pay
program suppliers. Subscribers of MDS must purchase a special antenna
and a down converter that changes the MDS signal to a standard VHF tele-
vision frequency and sends the signal down a cable to the subscriber's televi-
36
sion set.
MDS was originally created as an omnidirectional, narrow-band, point-to-
point microwave service.37 Because common carriers and private radio op-
erators made little use of the allocated frequencies, in 1970 the FCC re-
moved the 3.5 megahertz (MHz) bandwidth limitation from the two MDS
channels.38 Within two years, the FCC had received numerous applications
proposing to provide nonbroadcast, omnidirectional, point-to-multipoint,
closed circuit television relay service to customers on a common carrier ba-
Jurisdictional and Antitrust Considerations in the Regulation of the New Communications Tech-
nologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 789, 873 (1980).
32. 90 F.C.C.2d at 709-11.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally Channels Field Guide, supra note 1, at 34; NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra
note 22, at 6-8.
37. Instructional Television Fixed Serv., 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, 1207 (1983).
38. Id.
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sis. In response to the applicants, the Commission created MDS.39
Although the initial MDS license applications addressed the need for private
intragroup communications among schools, businesses, and municipal gov-
ernments, by 1978, sixty-eight percent of MDS service time was devoted to
transmitting subscription entertainment programming provided by program-
mer-customers.
By 1980, the demand for MDS frequencies had grown astronomically. As
a result, in July 1983, the Commission created multichannel, multipoint dis-
tribution service (MMDS) out of eight of the channels previously allocated
to ITFS.4 ° Less than two months later, the Commission received approxi-
mately 16,500 MMDS applications for 413 markets.41 The eight MMDS
channels are being licensed in two groups of four channels each.
Until recently, the FCC has regulated MDS and MMDS operators as
common carriers with no editorial control over the content of the program-
ming they transmit.4 2 Instead, MDS operators merely provided the "pipe-
line or the transmission medium and the customer determine[d] the content
of the communication and the points of communication. 4 3 They were obli-
gated to transmit the customer's message consistent with the customer's
desire.44
This line of reasoning has proved unpersuasive, however, because MDS
licensees may in fact exercise substantial control over the information trans-
mitted over their facilities. First, the MDS licensee can control the transmis-
sion of information indirectly via its tariff structure and service
philosophy. 45 As a practical matter, most MDS licensees have but one cus-
tomer with a long-term contract and thus have the option to engage in a
significant selection process when choosing among potential customers. Sec-
ond, MDS licensees may and sometimes do exercise substantial control over
39. Id. at 1214-16, 1220-22.
40. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
41. Second Report and Order, FCC Gen. Docket No. 80-112, released Feb. 1, 1985, at
1-2.
42. The rules governing MDS operations may be found in Multipoint Distribution Ser-
vice, 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974). For further discussion of the regulatory policy aspects of MDS,
see Botein, supra note 31, at 801-06; HouSE REPORT, supra note 1.
43. Microband Corp. of Am., 80 F.C.C.2d 211, 215 (1979).
44. Id. The Commission has been criticized for its continued regulation of MDS as a
common carrier after MDS' entry into the video marketplace. It is argued that such regulation
renders MDS less competitive with other video distribution services in which the video caster
maintains editorial control over content. See Brotman, Video Competition Suffers from Regu-
latory Lag, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23-30, 1985, at 9.
45. Lipper & Int'l Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d 2158 (1978). Indeed, MDS' leasing ar-
rangements are much more akin to those anticipated to be used by ITFS and may preclude the
common carrier status the Commission imposes on MDS. See Instructional Television Fixed
Serv., 94 F.C.C.2d at 1251-52.
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the transmission of information over their facilities through an "affiliated or
related" entity.4 6 The definition of an "affiliated or related entity" is ex-
tremely broad: "any financial or business relationship whatsoever by con-
tract or otherwise, directly or indirectly, between the carrier (MDS operator)
and the subscriber (programmer)."47
The relationship of MDS licensees with "affiliated or related" entities re-
cently led the Commission, in response to substantial congressional pressure,
to conclude that "it has become apparent that Congress labeled MDS a '[me-
dium] of mass communication' . . . because it felt that, as presently consti-
tuted, MDS operators do have the ability to exercise editorial control over a
substantial portion of the service."' Pursuant to the Commission's "fifty-
percent rule," an MDS operator may provide service to its affiliate for up to
fifty percent of its total programming time.49 An MDS operator's ability to
control the program content of fifty percent of its transmissions is closely
akin to the broadcaster's ability to exercise editorial control over the content
of its transmissions. Although the broadcaster theoretically maintains con-
trol over one-hundred percent of its transmissions, in actuality many broad-
casters have even less editorial control than an MDS operator.5" The MDS
operator's ability to exercise control over the information transmitted over
its frequencies is contrary to the service's common carrier classification.
Given the technical and product similarities between broadcast and MDS,
as well as the ability of licensees of both services to exercise significant con-
trol over transmission content, the services are far more alike than they are
different.
C. Instructional Television Fixed Service
Instructional television fixed service (ITFS) was created in 1963 in re-
sponse to the educational community's demand for television service that
could simultaneously transmit multiple channels of instructional program-
ming to a relatively small number of receiver sites." ITFS is a special mi-
crowave service primarily intended to deliver programming for credit to
46. 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b)(2) (1985).
47. Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616, 618 (1974).
48. Second Report and Order, FCC Gen. Docket No. 80-112, released Feb. 1, 1985, at
16.
49. Id.; see 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b)(2) (1985) (the "fifty-percent rule").
50. The Commission has sought to assure that broadcast television network affiliates
maintain control over their broadcast time via restrictions on the terms and length of affiliate
agreements and restrictions on the presentation of network-produced programming during
certain day periods. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1982).
51. Educational Television, 39 F.C.C. 846 (1963), reconsideration denied, 39 F.C.C. 873
(1964).
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students enrolled in accredited schools. ITFS stations may also be used to
transmit other educational, instructional, or cultural programming, includ-
ing in-service training and extension of professional training, to schools,
businesses, homes, or any other sites having the appropriate receiving and
conversion equipment. ITFS licensees52 are allowed to use excess capacity
on each of their channels to transmit non-ITFS programming, including
subscription programming, provided the licensees preserve at least forty
hours per channel, per week for ITFS purposes and at least twenty hours per
channel, per week are actually used for ITFS programming.53
In 1970, after a reassessment of ITFS usage, the Commission allocated
twenty-eight channels to ITFS on an exclusive basis.54 However, in 1983 the
Commission reallocated eight of ITFS's twenty-eight channels to create the
multichannel, multipoint distribution service (MMDS).55 The action was
taken because the ITFS channels remained underutilized, apparently be-
cause of the specialized nature of the service and the limited availability of
funding, while the demand for MMDS had increased dramatically over the
same period of time. 6 To facilitate efficient use of the remaining ITFS chan-
nels, the Commission now allows ITFS licensees to use or lease their excess
channel capacity for non-ITFS purposes as long as the ITFS licensees trans-
mit a minimum of twenty hours per channel, per week of traditional educa-
tional or instructional programming.57 Chief among the non-ITFS purposes
is the leasing of excess capacity to MDS operators who distribute subscrip-
tion programming to the public. To increase the usage of ITFS excess chan-
nel capacity further, the Commission also allows licensees who lease their
excess channel capacity to maintain editorial control over the content of the
programming transmitted over their facilities. Licensees are also afforded
great flexibility in contracting with others for the leasing of the excess
capacity. 58
As the Commission has recognized, there are great similarities between
MDS and the service to be provided by leasing "excess capacity" in the ITFS
52. Accredited educational institutions, governmental organizations engaged in the for-
mal education of enrolled students, and nonprofit organizations whose purposes are educa-
tional are all eligible to become ITFS licensees. Educational Television, 30 F.C.C.2d at 853-
54.
53. Instructional Television Fixed Serv., MM Docket No. 83-523, released June 20, 1985;
47 C.F.R. § 74.931(e) (1985).
54. Instructional Television, 30 F.C.C.2d 197 (1971).
55. Instructional Television Fixed Serv., 94 F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983).
56. Id. at 1216-24.
57. Second Report and Order In re Instructional Television Fixed Serv., MM Docket No.
83-523, released June 20, 1985, at 95-96; 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(e) (1985).
58. Second Report and Order In re Instructional Television Fixed Serv., MM Docket No.
83-523, released June 20, 1985, at } 101-06.
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service.59 The similarities between proposed DBS systems and the newly
proposed ITFS systems are also substantial. Both systems propose to use a
substantial portion of their main channel capacity for public distribution of
programming, that is, the programming will be directed towards "as many
people as can be interested in the particular program [or program service] as
distinguished from a point-to-point message service to specified individu-
als."'  Both systems propose to transmit programs of general interest, as
opposed to business data, proprietary information, or other matter intended
for limited or exclusive use. They both transmit directly to homes and both
make provision for the lease of substantial portions of their main channel
capacity to programmer-customers.
In contrast to both MDS and DBS, the Commission has refrained from
regulating ITFS as either a broadcaster or a common carrier. Yet ITFS has
characteristics of both. The Commission has not reached the question of
whether ITFS should be regulated as broadcasting because until recently
ITFS, like MDS, was considered, and was in fact, a point-to-point service
transmitting information of nongeneral interest to a limited segment of the
public.6 However, the Commission's recent decisions allow ITFS frequen-
cies to be used to disseminate commercial programming to as many people
as are interested in the particular program, or program service, wherever
they are situated. Thus, the new commercial use of ITFS is no less a form of
broadcasting than DBS or MDS. If ITFS were defined to include the trans-
mission of noncommercial educational and instructional information of
general interest to individual homes, arguably it would constitute
broadcasting.6 2
D. Private Operational Fixed Service
In 1975, the Commission created what is now known as private opera-
tional fixed service (OFS).6 3 OFS consists of private, fixed radio stations not
open to public correspondence but operated solely for the use of persons or
agencies operating their own radio communication facilities. 4 When it was
59. Id. at 1 80.
60. NAB, 740 F.2d at 1201 (citing Subscription Television Serv., 3 F.C.C.2d 1, 9-10
(1966)).
61. Instructional Television Fixed Serv., MM Docket No. 83-523, at 119-21.
62. See supra note 18.
63. Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 894 (1975).
64. 47 C.F.R. § 94.3 (1985). Only "persons" qualified for licensing in a radio service
under either 47 C.F.R. pt. 81 (stations on land in the maritime service and Alaska public fixed
stations); 47 C.F.R. pt. 87 (aviation services); or 47 C.F.R. pt. 90 (private land mobile radio
services), may be licensees of OFS facilities. 47 C.F.R. § 94.5 (1985). Until recently, OFS
licensees were limited to transmitting their own communications to their own subsidiaries or
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created, OFS was allocated three channels because the Commission recog-
nized that a small but significant number of private radio licensees desired to
use frequencies to address their growing television transmission needs.65 On
May 7, 1981, the FCC allowed OFS licensees to distribute video program-
ming to hotels and other commercial facilities on three channels in the 2.5
gigahertz (GHz) band. Sixty entities seeking to distribute video program-
ming to hotels and other locations filed over 1,400 applications in response
to the Commission's action. Finally, in 1983, the FCC allowed OFS licen-
sees to distribute their own video programming products and services to
"any receiving location including hotels, apartment house MATV systems,
and private residences, ' 66 and expanded the number of OFS frequencies
available for point-to-multipoint distribution of video programming.6 7 OFS
licensees must still maintain an ownership or contractural interest in the
video programming they distribute.6 8 In addition, they are prohibited from
leasing time to other commercial entities.6 9
Although it has recognized that "the programming content of OFS en-
tertainment service offerings may be very similar to the content of conven-
tional free broadcast services," 7 and that OFS service signals are point-to-
multipoint in nature, the Commission has held that OFS entertainment serv-
ices are not broadcasting. 7 ' According to the Commission, "OFS services
are 'addressed' communication intended for, and directed to, specific points
of reception-the licensee's paying customers. ,72 Consequently, reasoned
the Commission, OFS entertainment transmissions are "hybrid" in nature,
that is, having the characteristics of both broadcasting and point-to-point
services, in much the same manner as subscription FM radio service trans-
missions are hybrid.73 And, as such, OFS services are not subject to regula-
tion under title III. However, as OFS possesses all the relevant
characteristics of broadcasting including editorial control, OFS, like the
other subscription services, could be classified as broadcasting under sections
153(o) and 309(i) of the Communications Act.
customers only in the course of conducting their businesses. Use of Private Microwave Fre-
quencies, 86 F.C.C.2d 299, 300-01 (1981); Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d 715 (1983).
65. Use of Private Microwave Frequencies, 86 F.C.C.2d at 307-11.
66. Id.
67. Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d at 727.
68. Id.
69. 47 C.F.R. § 94.9(a)(1) (1985); Use of Private Microwave Facilities, 86 F.C.C.2d at
304, 309.
70. Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d at 737 n.29.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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II. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 153(o) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE
COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
In the process of authorizing each of the new subscription services, the
Commission has argued that although a subscription service may possess
some of the characteristics of broadcasting, the existence of other nonbroad-
cast characteristics precludes a determination that the service is broadcast-
ing and subject to title III. Thus, the Commission has determined that OFS
and ITFS are "hybrid" services, while DBS has been classified as experimen-
tal, and MDS and MMDS have been classified as common carriers. These
regulatory classifications recently were challenged in National Association of
Broadcasters v. FCC. " In NAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that a service that transmits signals di-
rectly to homes, intending those signals to be received by the public, clearly
fits the definition of a broadcaster under the Communications Act.7 5
The court considered DBS service to be broadcasting even when satellite
operators lease their channels to programmer-customers, and without regard
to whether the programming is provided to consumers on a "free" or sub-
scription basis.7 6 By contrast, the court held that DBS activities that pro-
vide "non-general interest, point-to-point service, where the format is of
interest to only a narrow class of subscribers and does not implicate the
broadcasting [objective] of the Act, need not be regulated as
broadcasting.""
In determining that broadcast regulation should apply to DBS program-
mers seeking general audiences, the court dismissed Commission arguments
justifying the exemption of DBS programmer-customers and common car-
rier licensees from broadcast regulation under title III. The court rejected
the notion that congressional failure to anticipate the development of DBS
and classify it as broadcasting or common carrier justified the Commission's
decision to exempt programmer-customers from title III regulation.7" It em-
phasized that regulation was compelled by the plain language of section
153(o) of the Communications Act, stating:
[T]he test for whether a particular activity constitutes broadcasting
is whether there is "an intent for public distribution," and whether
the programming is "of interest to the general. . . audience." . ..
When DBS systems transmit signals directly to homes with the in-
74. 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 1201.
76. Id. at 1204.
77. Id. at 1205.
78. Id. at 1203.
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tent that those signals be received by the public, such transmissions
rather clearly fit the definition of broadcasting. . . . That remains
true even if a common carrier satellite leases its channels to a cus-
tomer programmer who does not own any transmission facilities;
in such an arrangement, someone-either the lessee or the satellite
owner-is broadcasting. . . . [This] also remains true regardless
of whether a DBS system is advertiser or subscriber funded.7 9
The Commission acknowledges the significance of the NAB decision to its
current regulatory policies regarding subscription services when it states in
its January 8, 1986, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that:
The NAB v. FCC decision has a considerable impact on our regula-
tory policies. It affects not only common carrier DBS and domes-
tic fixed satellite services but other subscription services that
previously had not been classified as broadcasting. These services
include FM/SCA's, teletext and private OFS offerings, as well as
common carrier MDS (multi-point distribution services) that are
primarily subscription in nature. Unless the Commission estab-
lishes the non-broadcast status of these subscription offerings, it
may be required to apply to these previously unregulated services
the broadcast statutory provisions."0
Recognizing that the NAB court rejected the proposed exemption of sub-
scription services from broadcast regulation in part because of the Commis-
sion's holding that subscription television services were broadcasting, the
Commission seeks to nullify the NAB case by reclassifying STV and DBS as
nonbroadcast.8 ' In its January 8, 1986, NPRM, the Commission suggests
that although some similarities exist between the subscription services and
broadcasting, it would be prudent to classify all subscription services as
point-to-multipoint nonbroadcast services not subject to title III regulation.
The Commission argues that nothing in the Communications Act requires
that subscription services be classified as broadcast services or that the fair-
ness and political broadcast access provisions of title III apply to the serv-
ices.2 It suggests that the services are nonbroadcast in nature because their
transmissions are "addressed" to specific subscribers who are the services'
intended recipients and who enjoy a private contractual relationship with the
videocaster.83 The Commission sees the subscription characteristic of the
79. Id. at 1201 (citation omitted).
80. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 7.
81. Id. at 1 7, 36.
82. Id. at 11 31-36.
83. Addressable communications have been defined as those that are intended for, and
directed to, specific points of reception. In point-to-point microwave services, the specific
points of reception can be easily ascertained because they are located along a linear path. By
contrast, point-to-multipoint transmissions are omnidirectional, i.e., flow along multiple paths
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services as dispositive of the issue of addressability regardless of whether the
programming is of interest to the general public. According to the Commis-
sion, equating subscription with addressability comports more faithfully
with the distinction between broadcasting and point-to-point transmissions
embodied in the Communications Act, provides a more objective test that is
easier to administer, and is more cognizant of the financial reality in which
subscription services operate. 84 The Commission further posits that the con-
tractual relationship between the subscription service and its audience obvi-
ates the need for the viewer protections afforded by broadcast regulations
because subscription programming is transmitted to discrete audiences that
exercise direct economic choice over which services and programs to
receive. "
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
In supporting its proposed policy, the Commission argues that nothing in
section 153(o) of the Communications Act requires that subscription serv-
ices be classified as broadcasting, and that section 153(o) was clearly in-
tended to exclude from broadcasting all point-to-point transmission
services.8 6 However, a careful review of the legislative history of the Act
does not support the Commission's assertion. Although Congress recog-
nized the difference between the unaddressed transmission nature of broad-
casting and the addressed transmission nature of point-to-point
communications, it may nevertheless have intended that subscription broad-
cast services be deemed broadcasting.
During the congressional hearings on the Radio Act of 1927, the possibil-
ity that broadcasters might seek to implement pay services was debated in
the Senate by the principal authors of the Communications Act of 1934.87
Even though members of the Senate were skeptical of the prospect that
broadcasters would elect to provide pay rather than "free" services, they
nonetheless felt that a broadcaster should be allowed to provide pay serv-
to any point of reception within the reach of the signal. The Commission now argues that
point-to-multipoint transmissions are akin to point-to-point transmissions, and hence ad-
dressable, when the subscription service licensee's transmissions are intended for its subscrib-
ers. Operational Fixed Serv., 99 F.C.C.2d at 727 n.29.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 9.
87. 68 CONG. REC. 2580, 2880-81, 3033 (1927); see also Lyons & Hammer, Deregulatory
Options for a Direct Broadcast Satellite System, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 185, 191-93 (1981). The
Commission disagrees with this reading of the relevance of the legislative history. See Sub-
scription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 24 n.23.
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ices." Thus, the Congress believed that if pay operations developed, they
would be broadcasting.89 Indeed, the court in National Association of Thea-
tre Owners v. FCC,90 found support for the Commission's decision to author-
ize subscription television services in the aforementioned debates.9 ' Despite
the obvious importance which the NA TO court attached to the 1927 debates,
in its January 8, 1986, NPRM, the Commission apparently argues that Con-
gress' decision not to prohibit broadcasters from providing subscription serv-
ices is of "questionable value" in establishing Congress' intent that
subscription services provided over broadcast channels be deemed broad-
casting as defined in section 153(o). 9 2 In so doing the Commission could
certainly be viewed as questioning its authority to permit the establishment
of broadcast subscription services-a result it certainly does not seek.
IV. CASE HISTORY OF REGULATION OF SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES
According to the Commission, its proposal to equate subscription with
addressability is amply supported by legal precedent. In its January 8, 1986,
NPRM, the Commission seeks support in the early cases in which mul-
tiplexed radio subscription services were found to be akin to point-to-point
services and hence nonbroadcast in nature. Reliance is also placed on signal
piracy cases in which MDS and STV subscription services have been found
not to be broadcast services within the meaning of section 153(o) in order to
extend the protection of the signal piracy provision of section 705 to the
services' signals. Finally, the classifications of ITFS and OFS are cited by
the Commission as precedent for its proposal to reclassify STV and DBS as
nonbroadcast.
A. Frequency Modulation/Subsidiary Communications
Authorization Cases
In the frequency modulation/subsidiary communications authorization
(FM/SCA) cases,9 3 exemption from broadcast regulation was upheld for ra-
dio subscription services providing programming of interest to a limited au-
dience where the programming was transmitted over a small portion of the
licensee's main channel. The transmissions in question were not of general
88. 68 CONG. REC. 2580, 2880-81 (1927).
89. Id. at 2880-81, 3033.
90. 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
91. Id. at 201-02.
92. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 24 n.23.
93. See, e.g., Greater Washington Educ. Telecommunications Ass'n, 49 F.C.C.2d 948
(1974); Functional Music, Inc. v. United States, 274 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Muzak Corp.,
8 F.C.C. 581 (1941).
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interest to the public and were made to a distinct audience easily distin-
guished from the general public.
By contrast, the Commission seeks to foster a more narrow reading of the
cases in this area. In its January 8, 1986, NPRM, the Commission cites
KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp.,94
for the proposition that subscription service programming received by sub-
scribers alone was not broadcasting within the meaning of section 153(o) but
was akin to point-to-point service9 5 and that the controlling factor was the
licensee's intent to transmit only to subscribers. The Commission's recita-
tion of the case is incomplete, however. First, in KMLA, the court indeed
ascertained the licensee's intent from the fact that programming was mul-
tiplexed over the licensee's subcarrier authorization to subscribers who re-
ceived the service via special equipment. However, the case was decided
after Commission and judicial decisions that specifically required subscrip-
tion services to be transmitted via the licensee's multiplexed SCA in order
for the services to be deemed nonbroadcast and not subject to title 111.96
Further, in a later case, even the transmission of programming via mul-
tiplexed SCA was deemed an insufficient indication of licensee intent not to
broadcast to the public if in fact the service was later found to be provided to
a general audience.97 Second, KMLA was not the first instance in which
broadcast subscription transmissions were to be received by subscribers
alone. In In re Muzak Corporation,9' a broadcast applicant sought authority
to provide high-quality programming financed by direct payment from sub-
scribers. The Commission granted the application and classified the service
as broadcasting, stating:
The service which this applicant proposes will be available to the
general public; any member of the public, without discrimination,
may lease the equipment to receive the service. The distinguishing
feature will be that those receiving the programs will pay directly
rather than indirectly therefor. Operation of a station in this man-
ner is within the definition of broadcasting.99
B. The Signal Piracy Cases
In its January 8, 1986, NRPM, the signal piracy cases consist of instances
in which the Commission and the courts have considered whether a sub-
94. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
95. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 12.
96. See Greater Washington Educ. Telecommunications Ass'n, 49 F.C.C.2d 948 (1974).
97. Id. at 948-49.
98. 8 F.C.C. 581 (1941).
99. Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
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scription service is nonbroadcast for the purposes of section 705 of the Com-
munications Act (previously section 605). 10 In most cases, the Commission
and the courts have sought to protect the economic viability of the subscrip-
tion services by prohibiting unauthorized reception of the signal carrying the
subscription programming.' 0 '
The Commission cites several of the signal piracy cases to support its ar-
gument that transmission of subscription services are analogous to point-to-
point transmissions and nonbroadcast in nature because they are not in-
tended for the general public.' °2 For, in order for a service to be entitled to
protection under section 705, it was necessary to determine that it was pri-
vate communications not intended for the general public and hence not a
broadcast service either as defined in section 153(o) (concerning MDS) or as
interpreted in section 705 (concerning STV). However, the Commission
again presents only part of the holdings without granting proper deference to
the particular circumstances before the courts. First, a determination that
the services were broadcasting within the meaning of section 153(o) and sec-
tion 705 would have dealt a death blow to the subscription services because
they would have been unable to generate fees. Second, aside from being
faced with deciding the economic viability of the MDS and STV subscription
services, the courts were faced with ruling on the classification of at least one
technology (MDS) whose evolution, unbeknownst to the court, had out-
grown its preexisting regulatory classification.
The courts addressing the regulatory classification of MDS decided it was
common carrier, and hence nonbroadcast. However, the courts did not have
the benefit of Congress' statutory redefinition of MDS as a medium of mass
communication.10' If the court in Home Box Office Inc. v. Advanced Con-
sumer Technology " had been required to consider Congress' reclassifica-
tion of MDS, it would not have been able to distinguish the STV precedents
and conclude that MDS was not broadcasting because of its alleged common
100. See, e.g., National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981);
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. Pay TV, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967). See generally
Comment, Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
Prohibit Signal Piracy-And Should It?, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 531 (1984); Casenote,
Movie Systems Inc. v. Heller: The Unauthorized Interception of Subscription Television, 17
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1267 (1983-84); Note, Pirates Walk the Plank: Unauthorized Intercep-
tion of Pay TV Signals, 4 COMM/ENT. L.J. 141 (198 1); see also Lyons & Hammer, supra note
87, at 193-201.
101. Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
102. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 11-23.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(c)(i) (1982).
104. 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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carrier classification.' 5
In the STV piracy cases the courts found a way to extend section 705
protection to STV transmissions without invalidating STV's classification as
broadcasting under section 153(o). The courts ruled that the Commission
had not determined whether STV was to be considered broadcasting for the
purposes of section 605. Hence a decision by the courts that section 605
applied to STV was not precluded.'0 6 STV transmissions could then be de-
clared private by virtue of the subscriber's need for special reception equip-
ment, a fact which tended to establish in the court's view that the program
service was not intended for the general public.'0 7
The STV piracy cases arguably solve the apparent conflict between sec-
tions 153(o) and 705 and preserve the economic existence of the subscription
service alternative. These cases do not hold that a subscription service trans-
mitted over a broadcast channel is not broadcasting as defined by section
153(o)-a point which the Commission concedes. 08 Thus, the Commission
must look elsewhere for precedent to support its assertion that STV sub-
scription services are nonbroadcast within the meaning of section 153(o).
Nevertheless, the Commission does argue that "[i]f subscription television
involves private communications for section 705 purposes, we believe these
cases raise a significant question whether the service should then be classified
as 'intended to be received by the public' under section 3(o) and other provi-
sions of the Act."' 10 9
The Commission also cites its Teletext and OFS rulings as precedent for
its decision to forgo broadcast regulation of subscription services. In its
Teletext ruling, the Commission decided that because Teletext program
services are transmitted via a small portion of a television licensee's main
channel, they are nonbroadcast regardless of whether the programming
transmitted is of interest to the general public. iO The Commission has also
deemed OFS to be nonbroadcast by arguing that OFS services are "ad-
dressed" communications intended for and directed to specific points of re-
105. See infra note 106-09 and accompanying text.
106. See Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983); National Subscrip-
tion Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications Group
v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
107. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 464.
108. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 19-23.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Authorize the Transmission of Teletext by
TV Stations, Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Teletext Re-
port and Order], appeal pending, T.R.A.C. v. FCC, No. 85-1160 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 14,
1985); Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Authorize the Offering of Data Transmission
Services on the Vertical Blanking Interval by TV Stations, 50 Fed. Reg. 4658 (1985).
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ception-the licensee's paying subscribers."' With regard to Teletext, a
subscription service transmitted via a licensee's vertical blanking interval
(VBI), the Commission's current ruling constitutes a departure from the sec-
tion 153(o) exemption cases. In each of the previous cases, the exemption of
the subscription service was justified because of the limited nature of the
transmission vehicle (SCAs) and the limited nongeneral interest nature of
the service to be provided." 2 In its Teletext ruling and in the January 8,
1986, NPRM, the Commission seeks to rely on the limited nature of the
transmission vehicle alone as sufficient justification for the exemption.'
Therefore, the Commission's reliance on the section 153(o) exemption cases
to establish its Teletext precedent is misplaced. Reliance on the exemption
of OFS from broadcasting regulation is misplaced also because OFS does in
fact have all of the relevant characteristics of broadcasting.1 14
In its January 8, 1986, NPRM, the Commission presents what it believes
to be the legal precedent for its proposed decision to exempt all subscription
services from broadcast regulation. In essence, the Commission argues that
the section 153(o) exemption cases, the signal piracy cases and its Teletext
and OFS rulings support a determination that subscription services are non-
broadcast in nature irrespective of the content of the programming. On
closer analysis, the cases in question do not provide the necessary support
for the Commission's assertion, and, in many instances, contradict the
assertion.
V. CONCLUSION
"It looks like broadcasting, smells like broadcasting, tastes like broadcast-
ing, has all the benefits of broadcasting, but it's not regulated like broadcast-
ing because it didn't exist when the Communications Act was adopted?""' '
Contrary to the Commission's assertions, there is significant statutory,
regulatory, and judicial support for classifying subscription services as
broadcasting and therefore subject to limited content regulation under title
III. Although the services may enjoy a private contractual relationship with
their subscribers that incorporates some elements of addressable communi-
cations, the audiences are neither small enough nor distinct enough to suffi-
111. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 8.
112. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
113. Subscription Video Serv., supra note 9, at 8; Teletext Report and Order, supra note
110, at 27,062-64.
114. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
115. Remarks of Henry M. Rivera, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission,
before the American Law Institute-American Bar Association 8 (Mar. 29, 1984).
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ciently differentiate them legally or factually from the broadcast audience. 116
Despite Commission arguments to the contrary, the definition of broadcast-
ing under section 153(o) still incorporates both a finding of intent for public
distribution and determination of whether the programming is of interest to
the general public.
While the subscription/addressability dichotomy espoused by the Com-
mission may arguably be easier to administer, it is no more objective than
the current standard. It simply ignores the competitive nature of the rela-
tionship between subscription services and "conventional" broadcasting
services. All of them compete for audiences having similar if not identical
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics." 7 All of them compete for
these audiences by providing programming virtually identical to that pro-
vided by conventional broadcast services.
Moreover, as the courts have shown in recent piracy cases regarding STV
transmissions, a finding that a subscription service is broadcasting for pur-
poses of section 153(o) need not preclude section 705 protection. Thus, no
change in policy is necessary to protect the longevity of subscription serv-
ices. Indeed, given Congress' recent amendment to section 705,118 there is
no longer a need to view the courts' interpretation of section 705, which
extends signal piracy protection to STV, as strained. Congress has sanc-
tioned this interpretation as properly capturing its intent. Finally, the exer-
cise of choice enjoyed by subscribers of subscription services does not
sufficiently distinguish the viewing of subscription services from the viewing
of broadcast services, nor does it diminish the need for viewer protections
afforded by broadcast regulation. Whether one views conventional broad-
casting or subscription services, one must take an affirmative action to ac-
quire the equipment, turn it on, and view the programming. The invitation
to enter the home is not implied in either case. The difference is that one
option costs more than the other.
Viewer selection of programming under either the subscription regime or
the "free" broadcasting regime results in viewers receiving programming
from producers over which viewers have some control, whether it be via
pocketbook or boycott of advertiser or program. However, in neither case is
the control so complete as to assure exposure to new and or controversial
contrasting viewpoints and sufficient knowledge of public officials so that
116. "The business realities of electronic video media require that videocasters seek to at-
tract and hold the segments of the viewing audience controlling the largest portion of disposa-
ble income. These audience segments are typically white females and males eighteen to forty-
nine years of age." Hammond, supra note 6, at 643.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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viewers may exercise the responsibilities as citizens in a democracy.19
Moreover, the fragmentation of audiences may very well result in a loss of
democracy and national unity if not accompanied by some assurance that
everyone may receive information critical to the exercise of citizenship.' 2 °
For these reasons, as well as the fact that Congress has required that broad-
casters be regulated under the fairness and political broadcast provisions,
title III should be extended to the new subscription technologies-at least to
the extent that the provisions apply to subscription television and cable.
When addressing a gathering of lawyers, former Commissioner Henry M.
Rivera was moved to ask:
Can it be possible . . . that the applicability of Congressional and
FCC generated broadcasting policies can be allowed to depend on
what part of the radio spectrum is used to deliver . . . [the pro-
gramming service]? On the mechanics of how the service is pro-
vided? On whether it is delivered by satellite or terrestrial facility?
Or on whether the service is subscription, advertiser-supported or
free?'
2 1
119. As Benjamin Barber states:
A political price is paid for this new activism among viewers and the apparent decen-
tralization of television: Where television once united the nation, it will now frag-
ment it. Those it once brought together it will now keep apart. In place of
broadcasting comes the new ideal of "narrowcasting," in which each special audience
is systematically typed, located, and supplied with its own special programming.
Each group, each class, each race, and each religious sect can have its own programs,
and even its own mini-network, specially tailored to its distinct characteristics, views,
and needs. The critical communication between groups that is essential to the forging
of a national culture and public vision will vanish; in its place will come a new form
of communication within groups, where people need talk only to themselves and their
clones .... Faction-the scourge of democracy feared by its critics from James
Madison to Walter Lippmann-is given the support of technology; compromise, mu-
tualism, and empathy-indispensable to effective democratic consensus-are robbed
of their national medium. Every parochial voice gets a hearing (though only before
the already converted), and the public as a whole is left with no voice. No global
village, but a Tower of Babel: a hundred chattering mouths bereft of any common
language.
Barber, supra note 8, at 23-24.
120. Id. The fairness and political broadcast provisions would provide a safeguard against
both licensee bias and uninformed or unenlightened viewer selection.
121. Rivera, supra note 115, at 8.
Author's Note. On May 2, 1986, as this article was being prepared for printing, the FCC
issued a news release announcing its decision to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) regarding the regulatory classification of multipoint distribution service (MDS and
MMDS). See FCC, FCC Adopts Three Proposals Relevant to Regulatory Classification of Mul-
tipoint Distribution Service, REP. No. DC-485 (May 2, 1986) (announcing NPRM, FCC 86-
266). In the news release, the Commission briefly outlined its proposals:
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This author, and apparently the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, must respectfully answer-no.
(1) to permit all NDS applicants to elect to provide their services on a common carrier or
noncommon carrier basis;
(2) to subject all MDS applicants which elect to act as common carriers to limited regula-
tion under title II, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (regarding forborne regulation of nondominant common carriers);
(3) eliminate its rules prohibiting MDS operators acting as common carriers from influenc-
ing the content of the information they transmit, 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b)(1) (1985), or failing to
reserve space for use by others seeking access to the MDS operators' transmission capacity.
Id. § 21.903(b)(2).
If the Commission's proposals are adopted subsequent to public deliberation, MDS opera-
tors would find themselves with the same regulatory flexibility to compete across markets pres-
ently available to other video distribution services such as DBS. The advent of such flexibility
will not diminish the importance of title III regulation to those MDS operators. See supra
notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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